I. Introduction
There is growing consensus that formal structure, contract law regime, and cooperative exchange norms form the three main building blocks of governance (e.g., Williamson, 1991; Macneil, 1980) . At the same time, there is considerable debate about how cooperative exchange norms relate to the other building blocks to govern exchanges. First, disputes exist regarding the factors that underlie the emergence of cooperative exchange norms. Some analysts associate the emergence of cooperative norms directly with exchange attributes (Williamson, 1991) . Others downplay the link with transaction attributes, arguing instead that cooperative norms evolve over time as a function of the previous transacting experience of the exchange partners (Granovetter, 1985; Gulati, 1995; Gulati and Nickerson, 2002; Ring and Van de Ven, 1992; Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995) . Second, significant disagreement exists as to the performance effects of cooperative norms. Several authors contend that, given uncertainty, the presence of cooperative norms directly increases performance in inter-organizational exchanges (e.g., Artz and Brusch, 2000; Cannon, Achrol, and Gundlach, 2000; Noordewier, John, and Nevin, 1990 ) whereas others argue that established norms may actually be harmful (Eggertsson, 2000; Jeffries and Reed, 2000) .
Our study informs these debates by investigating the antecedents and performance implications of the presence of cooperative exchange norms within a special class of technology exchanges-those that occur between a Federal laboratory and a non-Federal party. Known as cooperative research and development agreements (CRDAs), these agreements offer a unique setting in which to explore the roles and consequences of cooperative exchange norms because the formal structure and contract law regime are administratively specified and remain essentially the same across exchanges. Nonetheless, CRDAs are heterogeneous in a variety of transaction dimensions, as well as in the extent to which they rely on cooperative norms. As such, we have an opportunity to unpack the antecedents and performance implications of variation in cooperative exchange norms without the added complication of variation among the other two building blocks of governance: law and structure.
Drawing upon transaction cost economics, relational contracting, and self-enforcing agreement frameworks, we argue that transaction attributes drive the development of cooperative exchange norms but do not completely determine them. Specifically, we predict that the expected (or desired) level of cooperative norms for a particular CRDA will be positively related to (1) the level of joint transaction-specific investments, that is the idiosyncratic investments made by both parties to the transaction, underlying the exchange and (2) the observability of effort. We further argue, however, that the realized level of cooperative exchange norms may deviate from the expected level; while management can put incentives and directives in place to develop such norms, cooperation results from social processes that management cannot directly control. As such, the realized level of cooperative exchange norms has a stochastic element.
Therefore, we hypothesize that, controlling for transaction attributes, exchange performance will be a function of the match, or--in other words--deviation, between the expected and realized levels of relational norms. Specifically, we hypothesize that realized cooperative norms that fall below expected cooperative norms correspond to lower exchange performance and realized norms that fall above correspond to higher exchange performance.
Our framework potentially bridges the gap between those researchers who focus on the emergence of cooperative exchange norms as a result of exchange attributes and those who focus on the evolution of such norms as a result of previous exchange experiences. Furthermore, by differentiating between the expected and realized levels of norms, our framework provides a means to illuminate the debate over the performance effects of norms of cooperation.
Our data consists of a survey of 182 CRDAs. Since we believe that transaction attributes are both antecedents to the emergence of cooperative norms and that they directly influence performance, we employ a two-stage regression model to correct for this endogeneity and to obtain an unbiased estimate of the norms-performance relationship. The empirical results support our hypotheses. Empirical analysis reveals that the level of cooperative norms increases with joint-specific investments and observability of effort. And yet exchange attributes do not fully explain the realized level of cooperative exchange norms. Our important finding with respect to performance is that--controlling for asset specificity and observability--perceived exchange performance deteriorates when the realized level of cooperative norms is lower than the expected levels. We also find that realized cooperative norms that exceed the expected level deliver perceived performance improvements in terms of evaluations of the other party's performance and willingness to collaborate in the future. Interestingly, norms above expected levels do not enhance the overall satisfaction of the transacting parties.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets forth the conceptual framework through which we distill hypotheses that relate key exchange attributes-observability and joint specific investments-to the emergence of cooperative norms as an element of governance. Pushing further, we then propose hypotheses that link transaction attributes and realized cooperative norms to performance. Section 3 describes the data and outlines the two-stage methodology that we use to test these hypotheses. We present our results in Section 4 and discuss them in Section 5. We offer concluding remarks in Section 6.
II.

Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses
The Role of Cooperative Norms in Inter-Organizational Exchange Exchange norms are shared expectations of how transacting individuals will and should behave (Macneil, 1980; Axelrod 1986; Macaulay, 1963) .
1 Based upon a set of nine common contract norms, Macneil (1980: 39) identifies three kinds of exchange norms: discrete, relational, and common. 2 Broadly, the differences in "intensity" of specific common norms lead to the "development of norms identifiable as particularly discrete or particularly relational." For example, the discrete norms of enhanced presentiation and enhanced discreteness are products of the amplification of the common contract norms of planning and consent. These discrete norms push exchange partners towards autonomous adaptation where individual actors optimize based on self-interest. Partners adjust terms of trade through bargaining, before entering short-term exchange arrangements (Macneil, 1978 (Macneil, , 1980 . Relational norms, on the other hand, support cooperative adaptation by stressing behaviors that should occur if relational continuance is valued along with behaviors that must occur for relationship preservation (Macneil, 1980) . We use the terms "relational" and "cooperative" exchange norms interchangeably.
The overall "cooperative" characteristic of exchange norms is in large part a function of three elemental norms: flexibility, solidarity, and participation. Flexibility provides for within relationship adaptation through the modification of agreement terms and/or agreement focus in response to unforeseen events and changing circumstances (Macneil, 1980; Boyle, Dwyer, Robicheaux, and Simpson, 1991; Noordewier, John, and Nevin, 1990) . Solidarity, which rests on the belief that interdependence is desirable, promotes a bilateral approach to problem-solving and supports mutual adjustments within the exchange relationship (Macneil, 1980; Poppo and Zenger, 2002) . Participation, the expectation as well as the realization of joint decision-making, facilitates collaborative change (Dwyer and Oh, 1988) . In sum, the presence of these three norms fosters an exchange environment conducive to cooperative adaptation within an ongoing exchange.
Such cooperative adaptive competencies become increasingly important in the presence of contractual hazards that can give rise to (1) maladaptation costs; (2) opportunism-related losses; and (3) investment cost recovery concerns (Williamson, 1996) . 3 The presence of norms that support cooperative adaptation can mitigate all three of the above concerns. In combination, the relational norms of flexibility, solidarity, and participation promote mutual adjustment that effectively reduces maladaptation (misalignment and renegotiation) costs (Artz and Brush, 2000) . Similarly, these norms mitigate opportunism-related losses by supporting a focus on joint rather than individual interests (Macneil, 1980; Cannon, Achrol, and Gundlach, 2000) . Finally, these three norms enhance the likelihood of relationship longevity, which is vital for investment cost recovery (Gundlach, Achrol, and Mentzer, 1995; Joskow, 1988; Palay, 1984) . In sum, the development of cooperative exchange norms as part of the governance structure provides a safeguard against key contracting hazards.
Joint Specific Investment, Observability, and the Emergence of Cooperative Exchange
Norms
Transaction cost economics' (TCE's) "discriminating alignment" logic provides a clear framework for determining when cooperative exchange norms would form a valued part of governance. It is less clear how one crafts incentives to develop such norms. We appeal to the self-enforcing agreement literature to understand the relationship between economic incentives and the formation of cooperative norms.
The assertion that "opportunistic behavior [can be] prevented by the threat of termination of the business relationship. . ." forms the cornerstone of the self-enforcing agreement literature (Klein, 1980: 358) . This literature argues that one can catalyze cooperation (and the associated emergence of cooperative norms) if the long-term gains to maintaining the trading relationship outweigh the short-term gains to cheating (Klein, 1980; Klein and Leffler, 1981; Tesler, 1981; Williamson, 1985) . 4 Operationally, three key levers exist in the self-enforcing framework: (1) the level of the private sanction-a loss that can be imposed upon exchange partners if and when the relationship is terminated (Klein, 1996); (2) the level of cheating-related rents-gains that
[undiscovered] non-cooperative behavior yields; and (3) the degree of transparency-the probability that non-cooperative behavior will be discovered and subsequently punished (Klein, 1995) . In combination, these factors determine the self-enforcing range for inter-organizational exchange. Our predictions regarding the emergence of cooperative norms build on the relationship of the transaction attributes of joint transaction-specific investments and on the observability of effort to the first and third levers in this self-enforcing mechanism.
Consider first the concept of private sanctions. The future loss that private sanction can impose is a function of the specific investments of the transacting parties. Specific investments are those investments made by the transacting parties that are non-redeployable in that they are less productive if employed outside the relationship by alternate users or for alternative uses (Klein, Crawford, and Alchian, 1978; Williamson 1985 Williamson , 1996 . At a minimum, each party stands to lose an amount equal to the discounted value of the quasi-rents accruing to their specific investments if the exchange relationship is prematurely terminated (Klein, 1996) . Whenever this potential loss exceeds the anticipated gains from breach (or non-cooperative behavior), the parties will find it in their best interest to adopt cooperative exchange norms that support withinrelationship adaptation and relationship continuation. Given the need to keep both parties cooperating, one would expect that joint specific investments would be instrumental in the emergence of relational exchange norms. A similar reasoning underlies Williamson's (1983) discussion of the development of credible commitments through reciprocal exposure. Through specific investments both parties effectively create a "mutual reliance relationship." Having "tied their hands" in this respect, cooperation becomes the rational course of action. Gundlach, Achrol and Metzer (1995) provide initial empirical support for this argument by finding a positive association between bilateral idiosyncratic investments and the development of cooperative norms. Thus, the following hypothesis:
The greater the level of joint transaction-specific investments underlying the exchange, the greater the level of cooperative norms characterizing the exchange, ceteris paribus.
In addition to enhancing the losses resulting from private sanctions, one can extend the self-enforcing range of an inter-organizational exchange by reducing the expected gains to noncooperative behavior. In general, such cheating rents are minimized under conditions of high transaction transparency, in which the partners can easily and quickly observe non-cooperative behavior. With greater observability, the temporal window for collecting cheating rents shortens as it becomes easier for the transaction partner to identify and respond to such behavior (Klein, 1995) . In short, increased observability strengthens the self-enforcing mechanism and thus makes it easier to elicit and sustain cooperative exchange norms (Kandori, 1992) . Axelrod (1984: 140) , in discussing the evolution of cooperation, draws the same conclusion noting, "[t]he ability to recognize defection when it occurs is not the only requirement for successful cooperation to emerge, but it certainly is an important one. Therefore, the scope of sustainable cooperation can be expanded by any improvements in the players' ability to . . . be confident about the prior actions that have actually been taken."
Thus, we hypothesize:
The greater the degree of observability associated with the exchange the greater the level of cooperative norms characterizing the relationship, ceteris paribus.
Cooperative Exchange Norms and Inter-Organizational Performance
As previous researchers note, the reach of management has limits. While "far-sighted" exchange partners can select among transactions and choose formal governance mechanisms with varying incentives ex ante, they cannot fully control how informal governance components like cooperative norms will develop ex post (Nickerson and Zenger, 2002; Zenger and Lazarini, 2002) . In other words, Tichy and Fombrum (1979: 929) introduced the metaphor of "organizational structure" representing the "pegs upon which the emergent network hangs" with "…Variations in these pegs… alter[ing] the form of the emergent networks." Nonetheless, these pegs do not fully determine the structure of informal governance. Though the incentive structures adopted ex ante constrain and shape behavior to a significant degree (as predicted in H1 and H2), the incapacity of management to directly control actions of employees leaves room for variance in the level of cooperative norms realized. The transacting parties seemingly control the expected mean level of cooperative norms, but the realized level of cooperative norms contains a stochastic element. Both the expected and realized levels of cooperative norms produce important performance implications. One achieves a discriminating alignment (or fit)
when the realized level of cooperative norms matches the expected level of norms that correspond to transaction attributes. Given the aforementioned stochastic element for the realized level of cooperative norms, one may not achieve a discriminating alignment.
When realized norms falls below their expected level, exchange performance, whether measured by economic outcome or perceptual measures, is likely to suffer for two reasons. First, a deficiency in cooperative norms effectively leaves the exchange under-safeguarded. This vulnerability represents a misalignment in the traditional TCE sense where economic performance can suffer due to hazard-related losses and/or maladaptation costs associated with insufficient adaptation capabilities (Williamson, 1985; Silverman et al., 1997) . Second, underrealization of cooperative norms can spur disenchantment and perhaps costly retaliation, as exchange partners are viewed as having violated behavioral expectations (Blau, 1964) .
Ultimately, these arguments suggest that a violation of pre-established expectations translates into a perception and most likely an economic reality of lower exchange performance. As such, we anticipate the following:
H3: The lower the realized level of cooperative exchange norms is compared to their expected level, the lower the level of exchange performance, ceteris paribus.
We further argue that over-realization of cooperative norms increases exchange performance. At first glance, this prediction appears to contradict the traditional TCE discriminating alignment logic in which a "misfit" between exchange attributes and governance degrades exchange performance because the cost of those governance mechanisms that are over and above what efficiency calls for exceeds the benefit they provide. In our model, however, the over-realization of cooperative norms results from stochastic process rather than a more expensive governance structure. In other words, the governance costs associated with the development of the self-enforcing mechanism are incurred with the goal of eliciting the expected level of cooperative norms; overshooting this expected level does not change the cost of the underlying incentives implemented to create such norms. Thus, the partners seemingly acquire the excess portion of the realized cooperative norms for free. Given the benefits believed to accrue to cooperative exchange norms-increased within relationship adaptability, smoother coordination, reduced opportunism, greater effort by the transacting parties-we expect the net economic performance benefit of an over-realization of cooperative norms to be positive (Artz and Brush, 2000; Dyer and Singh, 1998; Noordewier, John, and Nevin, 1990; Zaheer, McEvily, and Perone, 1998) . Thus, the following hypothesis:
H4: The higher the realized level of cooperative exchange norms is compared to their expected level, the higher the level of exchange performance, ceteris paribus.
III. Method Sample and Data Collection
Research setting. We empirically tested the hypotheses of interest in the context of collaborative R&D agreements between federal laboratories and a non-federal organization.
These CRDAs may involve a variety of activities ranging from explorations in science and technology, to directing programs of activities that develop practical competencies, to developing applied projects aimed at specific tasks. These exchanges are not procurement transactions. The organizations are not allowed to contribute monetary funds; hence, the agreements were mutual endeavors that required joint effort. Although these exchanges are not representative business transactions, CRDAs nonetheless provide a useful setting to examine the development and consequences of cooperative norms, as these exchanges are typically bilateral and noncompetitive in nature, with both parties contributing personnel, expertise, facilities and/or services to the exchange, typically with the goal of developing and spinning technologies in or out of the private sector. When technology is spun out to the private sector, there is an expectation that the technology will be applied in material and product development efforts that provide value to society in enhanced products and services that may subsequently be procured back into the government sector. In this manner, the organizations play a critical role in creating new knowledge for both the federal and private sectors through specialized innovation (Teece 1998) . The unit of analysis in our paper is the CRDA.
Sample characteristics. We approached a federal research laboratory for participation in the study and offered them a report of the overall results and customized analyses for their internal purposes. This laboratory provided the names of 324 Federal and non-Federal contacts that participated in CRDAs over a five-year period. We then mailed these individuals a questionnaire along with a postage-paid envelope and a cover letter explaining that the purpose of the study was to better understand the nature of collaborative exchanges. The respondents were guaranteed anonymity of their responses and were offered a summary report in exchange for their participation.
Two-hundred and twenty-nine individuals responded to the survey. After omitting those surveys with incorrect addresses or incomplete or unusable responses, our sample totaled 182, giving us an effective response rate of 56%. The CRDAs in our sample lasted approximately 1.9 years on average but could last as many as eight years. The mix of respondents included 38% managers, 25% scientists, 34% engineers and 3% staff. We provided respondents with the name of a specific CRDA project that they had worked on and asked them to complete all items with respect to the specific CRDA.
We assessed the respondent's knowledge of key aspects of the exchange via a battery of specific items at the conclusion of the survey. We asked respondents to indicate how knowledgeable they were about: the intended goals and purpose of the collaboration, each organization's resources committed to the collaboration, the overall success of the collaboration, and the outputs of the collaboration. They marked their response using a 7-point rating scale (1=hardly knowledgeable, 7=very knowledgeable). The mean response to these items fell between 6.25 and 6.5 with standard deviations ranging from 0.76 to 0.93.
We examined nonresponse bias by comparing early (first 75%) to late (last 25%)
responses (Armstrong and Overton, 1977) . T-tests of all constructs in the conceptual model indicated no significant differences between the early or late responses. Additionally, no differences emerged in the type of collaboration reported on or the duration of these collaborations. Collectively, these findings suggest that no fundamental differences existed in the responses or nature of the collaboration between early or late respondents.
Empirical Approach and Measures
We created a survey instrument based on in-depth interviews with the administrators of the CRDA program and non-federal participants. This instrument incorporated the language of the informants, drawing upon their experience in order to elicit responses that accurately reflect the organization's viewpoint (Campbell 1955) . We measured all of the constructs with multiple item, 7-point rating scales, according to the recommendations of Nunnally (1978) . The joint specificity scale was based on Anderson and Weitz (1992) . We drew the cooperative norm scales from the work of Heide and John (1992) and Dwyer and Oh (1987) . All other scales were designed specifically for this research. The anchors for all items were "1=strongly disagree" to "7=strongly agree."
Dependent Variables
Our empirical approach involves two sets of dependent variables. First, we examine the effect of joint specific investments and observability on the development of cooperative norms in each exchange. Thus, cooperative norms, or NORMS, constitute our first dependent variable.
Second, we examine the effect of deviations from the expected level of cooperative norms, controlling joint specific investments, observability, and our other covariates, on exchange performance. Thus, exchange performance constitutes our second dependent variable.
Cooperative norms. The elements underlying cooperative exchange norms include:
flexibility, solidarity, and participation. We use three items to identify each of these specific norms. Our first three items, which identify the norm or flexibility, include: (1) the organizations are flexible in responding to requests for changes; (2) the parties are willing to make adjustments when circumstances change; (3) when an unexpected situation arises, the parties adapt easily. Our next three questions identify the norm of solidarity: (1) problems that arise are treated by the organizations as joint rather than individual responsibilities; (2) both organizations are open to improvements that may benefit the collaboration as a whole, not only the individual parties; (3) both parties are concerned about their shared welfare, not just individual gains. The last three questions identify the norm of participation: (1) the organizations play an active role in various decisions regarding the collaboration, (2) the organizations consult each other when setting goals, (3) both parties seek and consider the other's opinions and suggestions regarding how to accomplish various tasks. We undertook an exploratory factor analysis and discovered that a single eigenvector captures 95% of the variation in these nine items. Moreover, the loading factors for each item loaded uniquely on to the first factor (Dillion and Goldstein 1984, 69) . Thus, we estimated Cronbach's alpha (Nunnally, 1978) for the battery of nine items, which yielded a scale reliability coefficient of 0.88. This value indicates a high level of reliability and led us to use the single resulting scale, NORMS, as our measure of cooperative norms.
Exchange performance. Our empirical context involves the transfer of technology for which precise economic measures of exchange performance are generally unavailable. For instance, accurate assessment of the amount or quality of knowledge transferred during the exchange is costly if not impossible to quantify (Ham and Mowery, 1998) . Thus, evaluating the economic affect of alignment or misalignment is typically unavailable to the parties of the exchange as well as to researchers.
This measurement difficulty largely limits performance measures for exchange participants to qualitative perceptual measures. As a result, we constructed three performance measures. Our first performance construct, EVALUATION, measures the other party's performance identified in two items: (1) their performance leaves a lot to be desired from an overall standpoint; (2) taking all the different factors into account, their performance has been excellent. Reverse coding the first item and calculating Cronbach's alpha yields a scale reliability coefficient of 0.82.
Our second performance construct, SATISFACTION, measures overall satisfaction with outcomes and is captured by three items: (1) we are satisfied with the outcomes from this collaboration; (2) our collaboration with them has been a successful one; (3) our collaboration with them has more than fulfilled our expectations. Calculating Cronbach's alpha for this battery of three items yields a scale reliability coefficient of 0.91.
Our third performance construct, FUTURE, measures willingness to collaborate in the future, which is captured by three items: (1) we would be willing to collaborate with them again, should the opportunity arise; (2) we would welcome the possibility of additional collaboration in the future; (3) we would be willing to work with them again in the future. Calculating
Cronbach's alpha for this battery of three items yields a scale reliability coefficient of 0.96. All three scale-reliability coefficients indicate a high level of reliability and led us to use EVALUATION, SATISFACTION, and FUTURE as measures of exchange performance.
Independent Variables
For the first stage of the analysis, our primary covariates are proxies for joint-specific investments and observability of effort within the exchange. A battery of four items can assess joint transaction-specific investments (JOINTTSIS): (1) if the collaboration were to end, both organizations would waste a lot of knowledge that is tailored to their relationship; (2) if either organization were to switch to a competitive buyer or vendor, they would lose a lot of the investments made in the present relationship; (3) both organizations have made investments that are unique to this relationship; (4) both organizations have made investments that would be lost if the relationship were prematurely terminated. The scale reliability coefficient for this battery is 0.77.
Observability (OBSERVABILITY) is identified by a battery of three items: (1) it is difficult for us to observe their activities; (2) we can easily observe their actions; (3) it is easy for us to observe their efforts. The scale reliability for this battery is 0.89. Both scales are of sufficient reliability to use as proxies for our primary covariates.
For the second stage of the analysis, the deviations from the expected level of cooperative norms are the theoretically important independent variables. Following Anderson (1988) and Silverman et al. (1997) , we use the residuals from the first stage analysis to measure the degree to which collaborations have achieved unanticipated high or low levels of cooperative norms.
We operationalize low and high levels of norms through two variables: LOW i = |ε 1i | if ε 1i < 0, else 0 and HIGH i = ε 1i if ε 1i > 0, else 0. These two variables not only allow us to estimate the performance implications of unanticipated low or high levels of cooperative norms, but they also control for potential endogeneity concerns since they are constructed from the predicted level of norms.
Control Variables
To insure the robustness of our results and to identify our regression models, we include a variety of control variables that may affect the development of cooperative norms, exchange performance, or both. SEPARABILITY identifies the extent to which each party's inputs are separable. The more separable the inputs, the lower the likelihood of conflict and hence the need for cooperation. Also, separable inputs may make it easier to accomplish the collaboration's goals and thus enhance performance. Thus, SEPARABILITY may affect both the level of cooperative norms and performance. We identify separability through a battery of three items:
(1) it is difficult to trace each party's contributions to the task; (2) each party's inputs into the task are easily separated; (3) each party's contributions to the task are distinct. The scale reliability for this battery is 0.634. While reliability is not high, we nonetheless employ the scale since it functions primarily as a control.
5 DEMAND identifies the extent to which demand related factors might affect either the level of cooperative norms or performance. High levels of demand for an organization's products may create competing demands for a partner's effort, which may lead to lower levels of cooperative norms or greater difficulty in achieving high performance. We measured two items:
(1) the demand for my organization's 'products' is high, (2) many units/organizations demand our 'outputs'. The scale reliability for this battery is 0.674. As with the prior scale, this value does not indicate high reliability. Nonetheless, we use the scale as a control.
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Collaborations may involve research at different stages or tiers of development (Hauser 1998) , which might affect the ease or difficulty of developing cooperative norms and achieving high performance. To control for this possibility, we include dummy variables for basic research (TIER 0), long-term explorations in science and/or technology (TIER 1), directed programs of activities to develop practical competencies (TIER 2), applied projects aimed at specific tasks (TIER 3), routine engineering for continuous improvement of products and processes (TIER4), and other (TIER5). Some collaborations may span multiple tiers and thus may include multiple dummies. TIER 0 is the omitted category.
The nature of intangible inputs may affect the ability to form cooperative norms or achieve high performance. To control for this possibility we include dummy variables that identify whether or not the responding partner ("our contribution") or the other partner ("their contribution") contributed specific types of intangible inputs. The five human inputs we identify are human resources (HUMAN_RES), intellectual property (INTEL_PROP), specific expertise (EXPERTISE), engineering skills (ENG_SKILLS), and management skills (MAN_SKILLS).
We add the suffix "1" if the input is related to "our contribution" and add the suffix "2" if the input is related to "their contribution."
Instrumental variables. We use two instruments that we assume affect the level of cooperative norms formed but that exert little impact on exchange performance after controlling for our other covariates. The first instrument, actually a battery of three items, represents the level of information requirements. The items include: (1) our information requirements were complex; (2) the task involved generic information that is widely available; (3) we needed to elaborate information to complete the task. This battery yields a low scale reliability coefficient (0.411); thus, we entered these three items individually in our estimations as INFO_REQ1, INFO_REQ2, and INFO_REQ3, respectively. Information requirements, we believe, contribute to the creation of cooperative norms by presenting opportunities for collaborators to interact and communicate. However, we assume that such requirements produce no direct effect on any of our measures of performance.
Our second instrument represents an understanding of the other's "transformation process" from inputs to outputs. We measure this understanding through a battery of three items:
(1) we understand well with the role of the other organization is in completing this task; (2) we know the processes and actions that the other party must do this task; (3) we can comprehend what the other party must do to accomplish their share of the task. This battery yields a scale reliability coefficient of 0.820. We label the resulting scale TRANSFORM. We assert that understanding a collaborator's transformation process encourages the development of cooperative norms because it helps to decide the domain over which cooperation is needed.
Understanding this domain improves coordination by ignoring the scope of tasks over which cooperation is needed. We maintain, however, that such an understanding does not directly affect performance. Understanding the transformation process could affect performance if it improved observability of the collaborators' actions; however, we measure such observability as a separate variable. Thus, we anticipate that TRANSFORM exerts no direct effect on performance. Except for our three performance measures, no correlation is high enough to pose estimation problems. We address the correlation among the three performance measures in our empirical methodology.
Analysis
We employed a two-stage model to assess the relationship between joint specific investment, observability, the level of cooperative norms, and exchange performance. It is likely that the level of cooperative norms and exchange performance are endogenous (i.e., each is a function of the other). For instance, exchange performance may depend on the level of cooperative norms, and the level of cooperative norms depends on the expected performance delivered by that level of norms. Moreover, unobserved heterogeneity may affect both the level of cooperative norms and performance. In either case, simple OLS estimation of norms on performance will reflect in part this unobserved heterogeneity. Such endogeneity problems would lead to an underestimation of the effect of joint transaction-specific investment or observability on performance. Our estimation method explicitly accounts for these potential biases by using a two-stage model. First, we implemented an OLS model whereby the level of cooperative norms is a function of all of our explanatory and control variables. The first stage model took the form:
(1) NORMS i = α 0 + α 1 *JOINTTSIS + α 2 *OBSERVABILITY + α 3 *SEPARABILITY + α 4 *DEMAND + α 5 *TIER 0 + α 6 *TIER 1 + α 7 *TIER 2 + α 8 *TIER 3 + α 9 *TIER 4 + α 10 *TIER 5 + α 11 *HUMAN_RES1 + α 12 *INTEL_PROP1 + where ε 1i is a random error term. Since survey respondents come from either government agencies or non-government firms, we controlled for the possibility of correlation among the responses from each type of respondent, which we implemented using a clustering option in STATA. Clustering affects the estimated standard errors and the variance-covariance matrix of the estimators but does not affect the estimated coefficients.
Second, we employed a second regression analysis to assess the effect of deviations from the average (i.e., expected) level of cooperative norms, controlling for our covariates, on performance. As noted earlier, we use the residuals of our first equation to measure the degree to which collaborations have achieved unanticipated high or low levels of cooperative norms. We operationalize low and high levels of norms through two variables: LOW i = |ε 1i | if ε 1i < 0, else 0 and HIGH i = ε 1i if ε 1i > 0, else 0. These two variables not only allow us to estimate the performance implications of unanticipated low or high levels of cooperative norms but also control for potential endogeneity since we construct them from the predicted level of norms. We omit our instruments from this second equation so that they econometrically identify the first equation. We also include our primary covariates in the second equation because we anticipate that higher levels of joint transaction-specific investment and that observability may directly increase exchange performance by creating more value (e.g., Dyer 1996) or lowering governance costs (e.g., Anderson, 1988) . Thus, the second stage model took the form:
(2) Y ij = β 0 + β 1 *LOW + β 2 *HIGH + β 3 *JOINTTSIS + β 4 *OBSERVABILITY + β 5 *SEPARABILITY + β 6 *DEMAND + β 7 *TIER 0 + β 8 *TIER 1 + β 9 *TIER 2 + β 10 *TIER 3 + β 11 *TIER 4 + β 12 *TIER 5 + β 13 *HUMAN_RES1 + β 14 *INTEL_PROP1 + β 15 *EXPERTISE1 + β 16 *ENG_SKILLS1 + β 17 *MAN_SKILLS1 + β 18 *HUMAN_RES2 + β 19 *INTEL_PROP2 + β 20 *EXPERTISE2 + β 21 *ENG_SKILLS2 + β 22 *MAN_SKILLS2 + ε 2i
where ε 2i is a random error term and Y j = {EVALUATION, SATISFACTION, FUTURE}.
Equation (2) thus represents three different performance equations by substituting the different performance constructs for each Y j . Because of the potential for correlation among the errors for these three equations (the three dependent variables are highly correlated), we estimate the three regressions using a seemingly unrelated regression technique (Zellner, 1962) .
IV. Results
Table 2 displays the set of two nested models through which we analyzed the level of cooperative norms in the exchange. Model 1 includes all control variables, which are largely insignificant. Coefficients for TIER 3, EXPERTISE1, and INFO_REQ2 exhibit some degree of statistical significance, but this significance does not remain when we add our primary covariates to the model. Since statistical significance for our controls is not consistent across our two models--suggesting that they do not play an important economic role in the relationships we investigate--and since we have no predictions concerning most of our controls, we focus on the coefficient estimates for our primary covariates. Model 2 incorporates our two primary covariates: JOINTTSIS and OBSERVABILITY. Adding these two covariates substantially increases R 2 to 0.510 from 0.287. Also, our F statistic indicates that Model 2 is statistically different from Model 1. Again, the coefficients for our control variables, except for HUMAN_RES1, MAN_SKILL2, and TRANSFORM, are insignificant. Examining these significant control variables, we find that the coefficient for TRANSFORM is positive and significant, which supports the view that understanding the transformation process increases the level of cooperative norms and indicates that the variable is a useful instrument.
Turning to our primary covariates, we find that the coefficient for JOINTTSIS is positive and significant (p < 0.05). This result provides support for hypothesis 1 as we find higher levels of joint transaction-specific investment correspond to higher levels of cooperative norms.
Consistent with H2, the coefficient for observability is also positive and somewhat significant (p < 0.10), indicating that greater transparency is associated with higher levels of cooperative norms. In sum, the first stage of our analysis confirms the predicted link between transaction attributes and the emergence of cooperative exchange norms. Table 3 displays the results from two SUR regressions that estimate exchange performance. Models 3A, 3B, and 3C present parameter estimates of a SUR model without controlling for joint specific investment and observability, while models 4A, 4B, and 4C present parameter estimates of the complete SUR model. Before discussing particular parameter estimates we note that adding our primary covariates to the baseline SUR model greatly improved both R 2 and χ 2 statistics. For instance, the R 2 for the EVALUATION, SATISFACTION, and FUTURE models increased to 0.473, 0.540, and 0.448 from 0.321, 0.365, and 0.278 respectively after we introduced JOINTTSIS and OBSERVABILITY into the three equations. The χ 2 statistic doubled or nearly doubled in each of the three models, which indicates a substantial improvement in fit by adding our primary covariates.
Even though we employ three different constructs for performance, our coefficient estimates are remarkably consistent across all three equations. Exchange performance, regardless of how it is measured, declines more as the level of cooperative norms sinks below the mean level as predicted by the exchange's corresponding attributes (i.e., model 2). Across models 4A, 4B, and 4C, the coefficient on LOW is negative and highly significant (p < 0.01).
Thus, as H3 predicts, exchange performance suffers when cooperative norms are unexpectedly low. In contrast, the parameter estimates for HIGH, while positive in five out of the six models, are not statistically consistent. In the three fully specified models, the coefficient is positive and insignificant for SATISFACTION, positive and weakly significant for EVALUATION, and positive and strongly significant for FUTURE. Unexpectedly high levels of realized cooperative norms appear not to affect satisfaction with the current exchange but do seem to increase the willingness of partners to collaborate in the future. We return to this issue in our discussion section, but for now we conclude that these findings offer partial support for H4.
We find higher levels of asset specificity and observability to correspond to higher levels of performance. Coefficients across models 4A, 4B, and 4C are consistently positive and highly significant (p < 0.01). This empirical evidence supports the common theoretical arguments linking transaction specificity and transaction observability to production and governance efficiencies (Alchain and Demsetz, 1972; Klein, Crawford, and Alchian, 1978; Williamson, 1985) .
In contrast to our first analysis in Table 2 , parameter estimates for several of our control variables in Table 3 are significant and consistent. For instance, the coefficient for SEPARABILITY is positive and highly significant in all models in Table 3 . Thus, a greater degree of separability corresponds to higher levels of performance. We find that directed programs of activities to develop practical competencies, TIER 2, and applied projects aimed at specific tasks, TIER 3, perform lower than our omitted category, basic research that lays the foundations for additional R&D, TIER 0. Although limited to EVALUATION and SATISFACTION, the coefficient for TIER 5 yields positive and significant performance benefits. Unfortunately, this category is defined as "other" projects not identified in tiers 0-4.
Thus, we draw no insights from this finding. The coefficients for own-firm engineering skills (ENG_SKILLS1) are positive and somewhat significant across five of the six models in Table 3 , which indicates that exchanges that rely on own engineering skills perform better than those collaborations that do not rely on such skills. None of the remaining control variables are consistently significant across the three performance models.
V. Discussion
The findings of our study are consistent with the use of a self-enforcing agreement framework to identify key antecedents of cooperative exchange norms. Transaction attributes can act as levers of self-enforcing agreements and as such have currency in explaining the emergence of cooperative norms. Specifically, joint specific investments create the means to impose private sanctions while observability provides transparency that enhances the chance that non-cooperative behavior will be discovered and punished. Increases in the strength of either lever expand the self-enforcing range and raises the level of cooperative exchange norms supported. Our empirical findings provide substantial support for this framework. As hypothesized, we find the realized level of cooperative exchange norms to be positively and statistically related to both joint transaction-specific investments and observability. Moreover, adding these theoretically driven independent variables to our base model substantially increases the model's explanatory power, indicating that these covariates may indeed exert an important affect on the realized level of cooperative exchange norms.
The study also illuminates the link between cooperative exchange norms and exchange performance. Consistent with our hypotheses, we found that exchange performance suffered when the realized level of cooperative exchange norms fell below the expected level of cooperative norms. The failure of cooperative norms to materialize as expected (given the transaction attributes in place) leaves the exchange inadequately safeguarded and thus susceptible to hazard-related losses. In such cases, the respondents expressed dissatisfaction with partner contribution and transaction outcomes in the current exchange, as well as unwillingness to "repeat their mistake" by collaborating with this partner in the future.
The findings associated with the over-realization of cooperative norms, while largely supportive of our predictions, also provide new insight into collaboration dynamics. Given that the assessment of economic performance proves difficult because of the nature of the exchange, our analysis shows that realized levels of cooperative exchange norms above the expected level produce no effect on satisfaction with current exchange outcomes, a weakly positive relationship with evaluations of partner performance, and a strong positive link with willingness to collaborate in the future. The variation across these perceptual performance measures, while not initially anticipated, nonetheless is consistent with our theoretical framework. Following the self-enforcing logic, we see that performance ultimately corresponds to the achievement of goals--in our case, the transfer of technology. Far-sighted collaborators structure the transaction so as to provide the expected level of cooperative norms needed to achieve the goal. As long as the goal of the exchange is met, then satisfaction with the current relationship is guaranteed.
Norms that exceed the expected level also guarantee meeting the goal of the exchange. From the perspective of goal achievement, as in Simon's (1947) satisficing assumption, higher levels of realized cooperative norms provide little additional value in the current transaction once the goal is achieved. Going above and beyond provides little added benefit in the current exchange but creates a favorable impression. The players in effect learn that it is feasible (and perhaps easier than they anticipate) to induce cooperation with their partner. This revelation that their partner is the "cooperative type" reduces behavioral uncertainty. This revelation in turn reduces the anticipated transaction costs associated with future interactions with this partner, which may allow for lower cost governance through a lower transparency requirement and/or the encouragement of greater joint specific investment in future exchanges. This conjecture, if correct, provides an explanation for the path dependency described by those who argue that cooperative norms evolve over time as a function of the previous transacting experience of the exchange partners.
The limitations of our analysis and the empirical setting must appropriately temper these
findings. An overarching concern is that the survey methodology might have created common method variance, particularly if the respondents were providing socially acceptable responsese.g., willingness to collaborate and cooperative exchange norms. However, the cover letter did not divulge the theoretical issues of interest, nor were any of the respondents in the pretest efforts able to guess the nature and purpose of the study. Moreover, all the construct items were separated and mixed such that no respondent would be able to detect which items were affecting which factors. Thus, we believe that we minimized the biasing possibilities of common method variance.
A more specific concern underlies our analysis of the norms-performance link. Our econometric model makes the important assumption that, after controlling for covariates, all exchanges in our dataset are statistically equivalent. This assumption allows us to construct the LOW and HIGH variables needed to analyze how the difference between the expected and realized level of cooperative norms affect performance. If exchanges are not equivalent, then unobserved heterogeneity could potentially drive these differences and/or directly affect performance. Rejecting this possibility becomes difficult with only cross-sectional data. Three factors, however, mitigate our concern. First, the narrow empirical scope of our analysisCRDAs-while limiting from a standpoint of generalizability, is beneficial in terms of unobserved heterogeneity in that the narrow scope potentially limits the sources of unobserved heterogeneity. Second, we include a large number of control and instrumental variables in our models. As such, we believe that potential omitted variable bias is low. Finally--perhaps most encouragingly--our empirical findings indicate an asymmetrical relationship between the deviations below the expected level of cooperative norms and performance from those above the expected level. We believe it is unlikely that omitted variable bias would induce such a pattern.
Empirical limitations notwithstanding, our findings yield several implications for the ongoing theoretical debates regarding the antecedents and performance ramifications of cooperative norms. Our findings lend strong support to the view that the emergence of cooperative norms is a function of the particulars of the transaction. However, we also find some evidence that current exchange experiences influence future collaborative choices. Namely, positive experiences increase willingness to engage in additional partnerships. In essence, our study provides insight into the process by which the combination of transaction attributes and partner selection catalyze cooperative behavior.
Our theory also unpacks the question of when cooperative exchange norms benefit performance. Our findings support those researchers who argue that exchange performance increases with the level of exchange norms. However, this relationship is more nuanced than scholars have previously argued. Our theory suggests that the greater the level of realized exchange norms, the greater the performance controlling for the expected level of cooperative norms. In other words, exchange performance increases if the realized level of norms exceeds the expected level, but this outcome is stochastic and thus management cannot rely on it.
Otherwise, our theory implies that higher levels of expected cooperative norms are more costly and that one should only choose higher levels of expected norms when a net benefit arises.
VI. Conclusion
Our study investigated the antecedents and performance implications of cooperative exchange norms. We argued that the level of expected cooperative exchange norms occurs in response to transaction attributes: notably, joint transaction-specific investments and observability. The greater the level of these two exchange attributes, the higher the level of cooperative exchange norms. We further argued that the realized level of cooperative exchange norms can deviate from the expected level since cooperation is the result of social processes that management cannot directly and fully control. The realized level of cooperative exchange norms thus possesses a stochastic element, which affects exchange performance. Performance suffers when the realized level of cooperative exchange norms falls below the expected level, whereas performance increases when the reverse is true. The analysis of a survey of 182 CRDAs provided support for our theory. 
